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Abstract
Topoi are known to be categories with extra properties that make them much alike the category of Sets. In
a Topoi it is possible to deﬁne adequate notions of membership, elements and subobjects, power ”sets”, and
ﬁnally, every Topoi has an internal logic able to justify any reasoning carried inside it. Most of the cases, this
logic is not Classical (Boolean). The general logic for the Topoi is Intuitionistic Higher-order Logic. Topoi
have their linguistic counter-part provided by Local Set Theories (LST). There is a deductive apparatus, in
the style of Sequent Calculus, able to justify logical consequence inside any LST. Counterfactuals are subtle
conditionals largely studied by the philosophical and logic community. Since Lewis, counterfactual have a
uniform semantics provided by means of Neighborhood systems on top a possible world style semantics. In
this article, taking into account the fundamental theorem on Topoi, we deﬁne, by means of the internal logic
of Graphs, Lewis counterfactuals and show how to use the LST deductive apparatus to prove properties
on counterfactual logic. This article can be also used as an initial step towards the deﬁnition of deductive
systems for counterfactual logic, taken in an alternative way the ones already existent in the logic literature.
Keywords: Category Theory, Topos, Logic, Counterfactuals
1 Introduction
Counterfactual conditionals diﬀer from indicative conditionals in a subtle way. Con-
ditional propositions involve two components, namely, the antecedent and the con-
sequent. Indicative conditionals, also known as material conditional, consider only
the assigned truth value to both, antecedent and consequent, when attaching truth
value to itself. The truth of an indicative conditional is based on the actual state-
of-aﬀairs, while a counterfactual conditional should take into account the truth of
the antecedent always, even if it is not the case. The truth of the antecedent is
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mandatory in this analysis. Some approaches to counterfactuals entails belief re-
vision, particularly those based on Ramsey test evaluation [7]. A possible way to
circumvent belief revision mechanisms is to consider alternative (possible) state-of-
aﬀairs and choose the closest one among the worlds that satisfy the antecedent.
If the consequent is true at this considered world then the counterfactual is true
also. The following phrases are instances of material and counterfactual conditionals
respectively.
• If Irak were a democracy it would not have been invaded by USA.
• If Irak were a democracy it would have had elections for president.
Both conditionals have false antecedents and false consequents in the current state-
of-aﬀairs. However, the second conditional is clearly truth, since election is a neces-
sary feature in a democracy. The intuitive reasoning for attaching truth value to a
counterfactual is to consider an alternative world with a minimal change generated
by taking the antecedent true. Instead of producing a belief revision in the current
world, Lewis [5] analyses the truth of the consequent in the closest worlds holding
the antecedent truth. By deﬁning diﬀerent neighborhood systems one can deﬁne
diﬀerent counterfactual logics. A neighborhood system, of any kind, is central in
the most traditional analysis of counterfactuals. In this article this is the case too.
The approaches to counterfactuals dealing with belief revision are out of scope of
this article. The symbol is used to denote counterfactual conditional, following
Lewis.
Modal logic semantics, namely possible worlds semantics, have been widely used
in the presentation of counterfactual semantics. There, a neighborhood system for
each world is meta-logically speciﬁed and a set of axioms is ruled out according the
intended semantics. Precise notions of completeness and soundness for each derived
counterfactual logic are stated in these cases.
Roughly speaking, a topos is a category provided with an internal logical theory
that resembles Set Theory. Formally, a Topos is a ﬁnitely complete and cocomplete
category with exponentials and subobject classiﬁer. From these features it is pos-
sible to deﬁne logic notions belonging to the Higher-Order (logic) setting. In [1] it
is deﬁned a Higher-Order logic called Local Set Theory able to derive propositions
preserving truth under any topos interpretation. Local Set Theory is the linguistic
counterpart of Toposes (pl. of Topos 4 ). On the other hand, any consistent set
of sentences in Local Set Theory describes a topos up to equivalence of categories.
Local Set Theory is complete under Topos semantics. Summarizing, by means of the
Local Set Theory inference system, one can derive any Topos-theoretic property at a
linguistic level. It is even possible to deﬁne a Local Truth modality inside any topos,
by means of Geometric Modalities induced by formal topologies deﬁned by covering
notions provided by sets of morphism. These modalities are in fact Normal 5 .
It is quite well known that the internal logic of a topos is general enough to deﬁne
set-like objects and concepts. In [2] a topos is categorically deﬁned and thereafter
4 Topoi (Latin) is also used as the plural of Topos.
5 A Modality is Normal, iﬀ, it satisﬁes the K axiom and the Go¨del rule of generalization
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some set-like notions intending to deﬁne heuristics and search based problems are
described by means of the language of Local Set Theory. The present article follows
this very approach towards the categorical deﬁnition of a topos, and, by means of
Local Set Theory, basic notions aiming to deﬁne classes of neighborhood systems
are also deﬁned. Following the framework initiated by Lewis [5], a counterfactual
conditional is deﬁned in the internal logic of the topos. For each possible neighbor-
hood system, the (internal) counterfactual logic can be analyzed and the inference
system of Local Set Theory may be used to derive proper counterfactual axioms and
to show that certain inference rules are derived rules inside LST.
In section 2 the basic categorical notions are deﬁned for the sake of terminology
deﬁnition. Section 3 deﬁnes the class of topos used in this article. Section 4 deﬁnes
the main notion of neighborhood systems and some of their instances. Section 5
deﬁnes logically the counterfactuals involved and compares them to known logical
systems existing in the literature on counterfactuals. Finally the conclusion follows.
2 Categories
We present here an axiomatic deﬁnition of a category [6,4].
Deﬁnition 2.1 A Category C is a 6-tuple
C = 〈C0,C1, ∂0, ∂1, ı, ◦〉
where:
(i) C0 is a collection of C-objects;
(ii) C1 is a collection of C-arrows;
(iii) ∂0 and ∂1 are functions assigning a C-object for each C-arrow 6 ;
(iv) ◦ : C21 → C1 is a partial operation assigning to a pair 〈g, f〉 of C-arrows, such
that ∂1(f) = ∂0(g), a C-arrow g◦f : ∂0(f)→ ∂1(g) and ◦ must be associative 7 ;
(v) ı : C0 → C1 is a function that assigns to each C-object b a C-arrow 1b : b → b,
such that, for each f : a → b and g : b → c, we have 1b ◦ f = f and g ◦ 1b = g.
We state here the fundamental concepts of Category Theory making use of
the Duality Principle. Given a concept, we may build its dual concept simply by
reversing all the arrows in the deﬁnition of this given concept.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An arrow f : a → b in a category C is monic 8 (dual epic) in C if
∀ h, g : c → a ((f ◦ g = f ◦ h)⇒ g = h)
Deﬁnition 2.3 An object 0 is initial (dual terminal) in a category C if, for every
object a of C, there is only one arrow from 0 to a in C.
6 ∂0 and ∂1 may be seen respectively as the domain and the codomain function for each arrow. If ∂0(f) = a
and ∂1(f) = b, we may represent the arrow as f : a → b or a f→ b.
7 It means that, whenever we have a
f→ b g→ c h→ d, we have the equation f ◦ (g ◦ h) = (f ◦ g) ◦ h
8 We denote that an arrow is monic by and epic by 
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Deﬁnition 2.4 A product (dual co-product) of two objects a and b in a category
C is an C-object a × b together with a pair 〈pra : a × b → a, prb : a × b → b〉 of
C-arrows such that for any pair of C-arrows 〈f : a × b → a, g : a × b → b〉 there is
only one arrow 〈f, g〉 : c → a× b making the following diagram to commute
c
f
 




g





〈f,g〉



a a× bpra prb  b
Deﬁnition 2.5 An arrow i : e → a in a category C is an equalizer (dual co-
equalizer) of a pair of C-arrows f, g : a → b if:
(i) f ◦ i = g ◦ i;
(ii) Whenever h : c → a has f ◦h = g◦h in C, there is exactly one C-arrow k : c → e
such that the following diagram commutes
e i  a
f 
g
 b
c
k



h

Deﬁnition 2.6 A pullback (dual pushout) of a pair of arrows a
f→ c g← b in a
category C is a pair of C-arrows a g
′
← d f
′
→ b such that:
(i) f ◦ g′ = g ◦ f ′;
(ii) Whenever a h← e j→ b are such that f ◦ h = g ◦ j, then
e
k
		


 j



h

d
f ′ 
g′

b
g

a
f  c
there is exactly one C-arrow k : e  d such that h = g′ ◦ k and j = f ′ ◦ k.
Deﬁnition 2.7 If C is a category with a terminal object 1, then a subobject clas-
siﬁer for C is a C-object Ω together with a C-arrow 	 : 1 → Ω that satisﬁes the
following axiom:
Ω-axiom. For each monic f : a d there is one and only one C-arrow χf : d → Ω
such that:
a 
f ′ 
!

d
χf

1  Ω
is a pullback square.
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Deﬁnition 2.8 An elementary Topos is a category E such that:
(i) E has terminal object;
(ii) E has equalizers;
(iii) E has pullbacks;
(iv) E has subobject classiﬁer;
Theorem 2.9 [4]
For any small category C, the functor category SetC is a topos.
3 The Graph Topos
A graph may be seen as functor from the category two below to the category Set.
So a graph is an object of the category of functors Graph = Settwo, which is a
topos.
A
 source 
target
 V

We follow the presentation of [4].
Deﬁnition 3.1 Initial object The functor 0 : two→ Set that maps A and V to
the empty set ∅ and maps all arrows to the empty arrow from ∅ to ∅.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Terminal object The functor 1 : two → Set that maps A and
V to the one element set {∗} and maps all arrows to the identity.
To deﬁne the subobject classiﬁer, we need
Deﬁnition 3.3 Given an object a of any category, we denote by Sa the collection
of all arrows with domain a. A sieve on a (also a-sieve) is any subset of Sa that is
closed by left composition.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Subobject classiﬁer The functor Ω : two→ Set such that
Ω(a) = {S | S sieve on a }
and, for an arrow f : a → b, Ω(f) : Ω(a) → Ω(b) is the function that takes a sieve
S on a to the sieve {g | g ◦ f ∈ S} on b.
Deﬁnition 3.5 The truth value true 	 : 1 .−→ Ω is the natural transformation
that has components 	a : {∗} → Ω(a) given by 	a(∗) = Sa.
We represent by ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .} the set of all ﬁnite ordinals, which is a repre-
sentation of the natural numbers.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Natural number object N : two→ Set is the constant functor
such that
N(A) = N(V ) = ω,N(f) = idω, f any arrow of two
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3.1 Local set theory
We are following [2].
Deﬁnition 3.7 A Local Language L is determined by the following components:
• Symbols: The unit symbol 1, the truth-value type symbol Ω, a collection of
ground type symbols A, B, C, ..., and a collection of function symbols f, g, h,
...;
• Types: The set of types of L is the least set T containing 1, Ω, all ground type
symbols A, B, C, ... and closed under the following operations:
· For A ∈ T , the power type PA is also in T ;
· For A1, . . . ,An ∈ T , the product type A1 × . . . ×An is also in T . For n = 0,
the product type is 1.
• Signatures: Each function f is associated to a signature A → B, where A and
B are types. This is denoted by f : A→ B;
• Variables: For each type A, there is a countable set of variables VA;
• Terms: For each type A, there is a set TA of terms of type A, deﬁned as follows:
·  ∈ T1;
· VA ∈ TA;
· For f : A→ B and τ ∈ TA, we have that f(τ) ∈ TB;
· For τi ∈ TAi(i = 1, . . . , n), we have that (τ1, . . . , τn) ∈ TA1×...×An . For n = 0,
this term is ;
· For τ ∈ TA1×...×An , we have that φi(τ) ∈ TAi(i = 1, . . . , n);
· For ϕ ∈ TΩ and x ∈ VA, we have that {x : ϕ} ∈ TPA;
· For terms σ and τ of type A, we have that σ = τ is a term of type TΩ;
· For terms σ and τ of types A and PA, respectively, we have that σ ∈ τ is a
term of type TΩ.
The terms of type TΩ are called formulas. We present now the axioms, the
inference rules of the LST and the logical operations.
Deﬁnition 3.8 Basic axioms
• Tautology α : α;
• Unity : x1 = ;
• Equality x = y, α(z/x) : α(z/y);
• Products : (〈x1, . . . , xn〉)i = xi
: x = 〈(x)1, . . . , (x)n〉;
• Comprehension x ∈ {x : α} ⇔ α;
Deﬁnition 3.9 Inference rules
• Thinning Γ  α
β,Γ  α
• Cut Γ  α α,Γ  β
Γ  β ( any free variables of α free in Γ or β )
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• Substitution Γ  α
Γ(x/τ)  α(x/τ) ( τ free for x in Γ and α )
• Extensionality Γ  x ∈ σ ⇔ x ∈ τ
Γ  σ = τ ( x is not free in Γ, σ, τ )
• Equivalence α,Γ  β β,Γ  α
Γ  α ⇔ β
Over those inference rules, [1] develop some inference relations that we will use
during the deductions.
Deﬁnition 3.10 Logical Operations
• L1) α ⇔ β for α = β;
• L2) 	 for ∗ = ∗;
• L3) α ∧ β for 〈α, β〉 = 〈	,	〉;
• L4) α ⇒ β for (α ∧ β)⇔ α;
• L5) ∀xα for {x : α} = {x : 	};
• L6) ⊥ for ∀ ωω;
• L7) ¬ α for α ⇒ ⊥;
• L8) α ∨ β for ∀ ω[(α ⇒ ω ∧ β ⇒ ω)⇒ ω];
• L9) ∃ xα for ∀ ω[∀ x(α ⇒ ω)⇒ ω];
Deﬁnition 3.11 A set-term is any term of power type PA for some type A.
In [1] it is shown how to deﬁne a Topos from any consistent Local Set Theory
(LST). We remind the reader that a LST can be deﬁned by a set of Sequents 9 .
This topos is built on top of linguistic constructions and validated by the LST
Sequent Calculus (shown previously). For example, the objects of the Category are
the Type symbols freely generated from those occurring in S (a set of sequents) by
the operations of type formation in a LST. A morphism (set-like function) from an
object A to an object B are the provable inhabitants of BA, so f : A → B, iﬀ,
S f ∈ AB. It can be proved that the category C(S) built in this way is a Topos
(see [1]). On the other hand, if we provide a Topos E, we have the Higher-Order
language, the local language, induced by this Topos and consequently the set of truth
formulas regarded E. This forms a theory Th(E) in the local language of the E. The
linguistic topos associated to Th(E), namely, C(Th(E)) is categorically equivalent
to E. This reﬂectiveness of categories (the Topoi and their Linguistic counterparts)
is important in our work. In the following section we deﬁne counterfactuals by means
of the internal logic of a concrete Topos. These deﬁnitions, although linguistic, have
their corresponding in the Topos itself up to a categorical equivalence. In this way
we have a safe, so to say consistently safe, track to achieve a Topos-theory able to
express counterfactuals.
9 Obviously, inconsistent LSTs do not have a Topos-model.
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4 Neighborhood Systems
Deﬁnition 4.1 Given a graph G, we deﬁne the set of its subgraphs by:
sub(G) = { 〈φ, ı〉 | ı ∈ Gφ ∧ ∀g ∈ φψ : ∀ h ∈ φψ : (g ◦ ı = h ◦ ı)⇔ g = h } 10
Now we deﬁne a relation in sub(G):
Deﬁnition 4.2 〈ψ, j〉 G 〈φ, i〉 ⇔ 〈ψ, j〉 ∈ sub(i(φ))
Until now we admit any initial object as subgraph. To avoid them, we deﬁne
Deﬁnition 4.3
sub∗(G) = { 〈φ, i〉 ∈ sub(G) | ∃ψ : ∃σ ∈ φψ : ∃τ ∈ φψ : σ = τ }
We will use the same symbol for G and its restriction to sub∗(G) × sub∗(G).
We may also omit the index when no doubt is possible.
Deﬁnition 4.4 The set of vertexes of a given graph G are deﬁned by
ν(G) = {v ∈ sub∗(G) | ∀ s ∈ sub∗(G) : s G v ⇒ v G s}
Deﬁnition 4.5 Given a graph G, we deﬁne the set of nested neighborhoods by
ρ(G) = { S ∈ P sub∗(G) | G ∩ S × S is a total order }
Deﬁnition 4.6 A neighborhood system $ of a graph G is a function between sub-
graphs and nested neighborhoods. $ ∈ ρ(G)sub(G)
5 Counterfactuals
Given a Kripke frame K = 〈W,〉, in whichW is a non-empty set and  ⊆ W×W,
we may see the frame as a directed graph. Given a neighborhood system $, we may
start to deﬁne our logic system for counterfactuals.
To give the notion behind the deﬁnition of the  operator, we present the
speciﬁcation Lewis [5] gave:
α β is true at a world u (according to a neighborhood system $) iﬀ either:
(i) For no world w in $(u), |=w α;
(ii) Some neighborhood N in $(u) has a world w such that |=w α and |=v α ⇒ β
in every world v of N .
Deﬁnition 5.1 Given a model M = 〈W,, V 〉 on a Kripke frame K and a neigh-
borhood system $ of K, we deﬁne the relation |= between worlds and formulas:
(i) For an atomic formula α, |=u α iﬀ u ∈ V (α);
10So ı must be a monic arrow.
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(ii) |=u ¬ α iﬀ |=u α;
(iii) |=u α ∧ β iﬀ |=u α and |=u β;
(iv) |=u α ∨ β iﬀ |=u α or |=u β;
(v) |=u α ⇒ β iﬀ |=u ¬ α or |=u β;
(vi) |=u α β iﬀ
∀ N ∈ $(u) : ∀ v ∈ ν(K) : v K N ⇒ |=v α or
{ ∃ N ∈ $(u) : ∀ v ∈ ν(K) : v K N ⇒ (|=v α ⇒ β) and
∃ w ∈ ν(K) : w K N ∧ |=w α }.
The deﬁnition of the relation |= for the counterfactual follows the description
of Lewis [5]. But here we use the accessibility relation  of the Kripke frame to
make a particular account of a similarity relationship.
We do not care about closeness of intersections and of unions, because Lewis
[5] does not present them as obligatory at the ﬁnal chapter of his book. Instead of
using the deﬁnition of the operator, we adopt here the comparative possibility
operator  just to follow [5,3].
The speciﬁcation for the  operator: α  β is true at a world u (according
to a neighborhood system $) iﬀ, for every neighborhood S in $(u), if S contains a
β-world 11 , then S contains a α-world.
(vi’) |=u α  β iﬀ ∀ N ∈ $(u) :
( ∃ v ∈ ν(K) : v K N ∧ |=v β)⇒ ( ∃ w ∈ ν(K) : w K N ∧ |=w α)
To simplify the reading and writing, we introduce:
Deﬁnition 5.2 The relation |= may be extended to any subgraph N ∈ sub∗(K) as
follows:
• |=N α iﬀ ∀ s ∈ sub∗(K) : s K N ⇒ |=s α;
• |=N α iﬀ ∃ s ∈ sub∗(K) : s K N ∧ |=s α;
Now the rule for the comparative possibility becomes:
(vi”) |=u α  β iﬀ ∀ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬β ⇒ |=N ¬α
But we can extend |= even further:
Deﬁnition 5.3 The relation |= may be extended to any nested neighborhood N of
K as follows:
• |=N α iﬀ ∀ s ∈ N : |=s α;
• |=N α iﬀ ∃ s ∈ N : |=s α.
Now we may introduce the other operators that Lewis [5] deﬁnes in terms of the
comparative possibility, presenting their speciﬁcations and using the local language.
For any non-empty subgraph u of K we have the equations:
• α ≺ β =df ¬ (β  α);
11A β-world is any world v, such that |=v β holds.
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· α ≺ β is true at u (according to $) iﬀ some neighborhood in $(u) contains a
α-world but no β-world.
· α ≺ β ≡u ∃ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬ α ∧ |=N ¬β.
• α ≈ β =df α  β ∧ β  α;
· α ≈ β is true at u (according to $) iﬀ all and only those neighborhoods in $(u)
that contains α-worlds contains β-worlds;
· α ≈ β ≡u ∀ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬ α ⇔ |=N ¬β.
• α =df α ≺ ⊥;
· α is true at u (according to $) iﬀ α is true at some world in some neighborhood
in $(u);
· α ≡u |=$(u) ¬ α.
• α =df ¬  ¬ α ( or ⊥ ≈ ¬ α );
· α is true at u (according to $) iﬀ α is true at every world in every sphere in
$(u);
· α ≡u |=$(u) α.
•  α =df α ≈ 	;
·  α is true at u (according to $) iﬀ α is true at some world in every neighborhood
in $(u);
·  α ≡u ∀ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α.
• α =df ¬  ¬ α ( or 	 ≺ ¬ α );
· α is true at u (according to $) iﬀ α is true at every world in some neighborhood
in $(u);
· α ≡u ∃ N ∈ $(u) : |=N α.
• α β =df (α ∧ β) ≺ (α ∧ ¬ β);
· α β is true at u (according to $) iﬀ there is some neighborhood S in $(u)
such that S contains at least one α-world and α ⇒ β is true at every world in
S;
· α β ≡u ∃ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬(α ∧ β) ∧ |=N ¬(α ∧ ¬ β)
≡u ∃ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬ α ∧ |=N (α ⇒ β).
• α β =df ¬ (α ¬ β) ( or (α ∧ β)  (α ∧ ¬ β) );
· α β is true at u (according to $) iﬀ every neighborhood in $(u) that contains
at least one α-world contains at least one α-world at which α ∧ β holds;
α β ≡u ∀ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬(α ∧ ¬ β) ⇒ |=N ¬(α ∧ β)
≡u ∀ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬ α ⇒ |=N ¬(α ∧ β)
• α β =df α ⇒ (α β);
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α β ≡u |=$(u) ¬α ⇒
∃ M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬(α ∧ β) ∧ |=M ¬(α ∧ ¬ β)
≡u |=$(u) ¬α ⇒
∃ M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬ α ∧ |=M (α ⇒ β)
• α β =df α ∧ (α β);
· α β is true at u (according to $) iﬀ both:
(i) some α-world belongs to some neighborhood in $(u);
(ii) every neighborhood in $(u) that contains at least one α-world contains at least
one world where α ∧ β holds;
α β ≡u ∃ N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α ∧
∀ M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬α ⇒ |=M ¬(α ∧ β)
We used here u as reference to an arbitrary world, but the deﬁnitions work as
well for any subgraph of K. A formula α is a valid formula on the model M iﬀ,
for every subgraph S of K, |=S α holds. An axiom also requires that under every
neighborhood function $, |=S α holds. Now we investigate the axioms presented
by Lewis [5] and show proofs for a given Kripke frame K, a given neighborhood
function $ and a given subgraph u. Since we do not require any property of them,
they are arbitrary and the deductive relation between axioms and conditions for $
will follows. We remark here that those axioms are actually schemata for formulas.
• The normality condition requires that $(u) is not void: ∃ N : N ∈ $(u). Axiom
N : 	 ≺ ⊥ ≡u ∃ N ∈ $(s) : |=N ⊥∧ |=N 	
∃ N : N ∈ $(u)  ∃ N : N ∈ $(u)
∃N : N ∈ $(u) ∧ |=N ⊥  ∃ N : N ∈ $(u)
∃N : N ∈ $(u) ∧ |=N ⊥∧ |=N 	  ∃ N : N ∈ $(u)
∃N ∈ $(u) : |=N ⊥∧ |=N 	  ∃ N : N ∈ $(u)
• The totally reﬂexive condition requires that u belongs to the union of its neigh-
borhoods: ∀v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ⇒ ∃N ∈ $(u) : v  N . Axiom T :  α ⇒ α ≡u
|=$(u) α ⇒ |=u α
In the following, we need a lemma for vertex:
τ  u ∧ |=τ α  τ  u ∧ |=τ α
τ ∈ sub(u) : |=τ α  τ ∈ ν(u) : |=τ α
∀s ∈ sub(u) : |=s α  τ ∈ ν(u) : |=τ α
∀s ∈ sub(u) : |=s α  ∀v ∈ ν(u) : |=v α
|=u α  ∀v ∈ ν(u) : |=v α
The condition follows directly from the axiom ⊥ ⇒ ⊥.
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∃v ∈ ν(K) : ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N ∧ v  u ∧ |=v α 
∃v ∈ ν(K) : ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N ∧ v  u ∧ |=v α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
∃v ∈ ν(K) : ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N ∧ v  u ∧ |=v α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N  w  τ ∧ w  u ∧ |=w α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N  w  τ ∧ w  u ∧ |=w α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
(w  τ ∧ w  u ∧ |=w α) ∨ ( |=w α ∧ w  u ∧ |=w α)
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
(w  τ∨ |=w α) ∧ (w  u ∧ |=w α)
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
(w  τ ⇒ |=w α) ∧ (w  u ∧ |=w α)
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
τ ∈ $(u) : w ∈ ν(K) : w  τ ⇒ |=w α ∧ w ∈ ν(K) : w  u∧ |=w α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
∀M ∈ $(u) : ∀t ∈ ν(K) : t M ⇒ |=t α ∧ ∃s ∈ ν(K) : s  u∧ |=u α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
∀M ∈ $(u) : |=M α ∧ |=u α
∃v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ∧ |=v α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : v  N 
|=$(u) α ∧ |=u α
|=$(u) α ⇒ |=u α 
∀v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ⇒ ( |=v α ∨ ∃N ∈ $(u) : v  N)
α ⇒ α  ∀v ∈ ν(K) : v  u ⇒ ( |=v α ∨ ∃N ∈ $(u) : v  N)
• The weakly centered condition requires that u belongs to each of its neighborhoods
and there is at least one such neighborhoods: ∃N ∈ $(u) ∧ ∀M ∈ $(u) : u  M .
Axiom W : ( α ∨ α)⇒ α
∀N ∈ $(u)  ∀N ∈ $(u)
∀N ∈ $(u)  τ ∈ $(u)
∀N ∈ $(u)  τ ∈ $(u)∨ |=τ α
∀N ∈ $(u)  ∀M : M ∈ $(u)∨ |=M α
∀N ∈ $(u)  ∀M : M ∈ $(u)⇒|=M α
∀N ∈ $(u)  |=$(u) α
∀N ∈ $(u)  |=$(u) α ∨ ∃N ∈ $(u) : |=N α
∀N ∈ $(u)  (α ∨α)
|=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u)  (α ∨α)
|=u α,∀N ∈ $(u)  |=u α
|=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u)  |=u α
|=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u)  (α ∨α) ∧ |=u α
(α ∨α)⇒ α  α ∨ ∃N ∈ $(u)
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The axiom (⊥ ∨⊥)⇒ ⊥ assures that $ is not void. Another proof may be
given using the T axiom because (α ∨α)⇒ α ≡ (α ⇒ α) ∧ (α ⇒ α).
∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N  ∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N
∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N  u  τ
∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N  τ ∈ $(u) : |=tau α ∧ |=u α
∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N  ∃M ∈ $(u) : |=M α ∧ |=u α
∃N ∈ $(u) : u  N  α∧ |=u α
α ⇒ α  ∀N ∈ $(u) : u  N
We used the lemma:
Σ:
false, u ∈ sub(τ)α  false
|=u α, |=u α, u ∈ sub(τ)  false
∀s ∈ sub(τ) :|=s α, |=u α, u ∈ sub(τ)  false
∀s ∈ sub(τ) :|=s α, |=u α, u  τ  false
|=τ α, |=u α, u  τ  false
|=τ α∧ |=u α  u  τ
• $ is centered if u ∈ $(u). Axiom C :  α ⇒ α
Here we see the ﬁrst distinction we must do between worlds and classes of
worlds, because |=u α ≡ |=u ¬α when u is a world.
∀N ∈ $(u) : N = u  ∀N ∈ $(u) : N = u
u ∈ $(u)  τ = u
u ∈ $(u)  τ  u
u ∈ $(u)  |=u ¬α ∧ τ ∈ $(u) : |=τ ¬α
u ∈ $(u)  |=u ¬α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α
u ∈ $(u)  |=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α
 α ⇒ α  u ∈ $(u)
Here we used again the Σ lemma of the previous axiom.
∀N ∈ $(u) : N = u  ∀N ∈ $(u) : N = u
u ∈ $(u)  τ = u
u ∈ $(u)  τ  u
u ∈ $(u)  |=u ¬α ∧ τ ∈ $(u) : |=τ ¬α
u ∈ $(u)  |=u ¬α ∧ |=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α
|=u ¬α ∧ u ∈ $(u)  |=u α ∧ ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α
 α ⇒ α  u ∈ $(u)∨ |=u ¬α
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The result follow from the axiom  	 ⇒ 	.
We know from Lewis [5], that C implies W because α∨α ⇒  α, using the
fact that neighborhoods are nested and not void. We represent it by requiring
that  provides a total order inside the nested neighborhoods and that nested
neighborhoods are built only with non-initial objects. O ≡ ∀M ∈ $(u) : ∀N ∈
$(u) : N M∨M  N . We used the Σ lemma twice to achieve the contradictions.
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  ∀γ ∈ sub∗(τ) : |=γ α
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  γ ∈ sub∗(τ) : |=γ α
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  ∃s ∈ sub∗(τ) : |=s α
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  τ ∈ $(u) : |=τ ¬α
∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  ∀N ∈ $(u) : |=N ¬α
α   α
false  false
|=τ α, |=γ ¬α, γ  τ  false
false  false
|=τ α, |=γ ¬α, τ  γ  false
|=τ α, |=γ ¬α, (τ  γ ∨ γ  τ)  false
O, τ ∈ $(u) : |=τ α, γ ∈ $(u) : |=γ ¬α  false
O,∃N ∈ $(u) : |=N α,∃M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬α  false
O, ∃N ∈ $(u) : |=N α  ∀M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬α
O,α   α
The other axioms may also deduct the respective conditions, but due to space
limitation, we do not present them here.
• Stalnaker assumption: S : ((α ∧ β) ≈ (α ∧ ¬ β))⇒ ¬ α
• Uniformity: U :  α ⇒ α and  α ⇒ α
• Absoluteness: A : α  β ⇒ (α  β) and α ≺ β ⇒ (α ≺ β)
Three conditions need a combination of axioms:
• Universality: UT ;
• Weak triviality: WA;
• Triviality: CA.
The Limit Assumption does not have any axiom [5].
5.1 Example for a given sentence
Given a Kripke frame K that represents the international politics, with the natural
language predicates: D for democracy and E for elections. To show that the state-
ment: “If Irak were a democracy it would have had elections for president.” is valid,
we suppose that we have any system of neighborhoods $. We deﬁne V ≡ |=K D ⇒ E
as an axiom of our representation. We take u as any world or class of worlds in our
frame K.
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|=$(u) ¬D,V  |=$(u) ¬D
(	|=$(u) ¬D)|=$(u) ¬D,V  |=τ ¬ D Π
(right ∧)|=$(u) ¬D,V  τ ∈ $(u) : |=τ ¬ D∧ |=τ D ⇒ E
(right ∃)|=$(u) ¬D,V  ∃ M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬ D∧ |=M D ⇒ E
(right ⇒)
V  |=$(u) ¬D ⇒ ∃ M ∈ $(u) : |=M ¬ D∧ |=M D ⇒ E
()
V  D E
Π:
|=$(u) ¬D, |=τ D ⇒ E  |=τ D ⇒ E
(left ∀)|=$(u) ¬D,∀s : |=s D ⇒ E  |=τ D ⇒ E
(V )|=$(u) ¬D,V  |=τ D ⇒ E
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have treated the Counterfactual conditionals through logic notions
belonging to the Higher-Order (logic) setting. To do so we have used a Higher-
Order logic called Local Set Theory, which is able to derive propositions preserving
truth under any topos interpretation. It gave us the possibility, using the Local
Set Theory inference system, to derive any Topos-theoretic property at a linguistic
level.
Following the framework initiated by Lewis [5], a counterfactual conditional is
deﬁned in the internal logic of the topos. For each possible neighborhood system,
the (internal) counterfactual logic can be analyzed and the inference system of Local
Set Theory may be used to derive proper counterfactual axioms and to show that
certain inference rules are derived rules inside LST. We could also see that some
linguistic deﬁnitions for the Lewis analysis could be described and employed inside
the logical deductions as in the proof of C ⇒W .
The present topos-theoretic analysis could be used, in a future work, to obtain
a counterfactual deﬁnition using Groethendieck topologies instead of making those
deﬁnitions inside the Graph Topos. In doing so, one may conclude that there is a
counterfactual deﬁnition inside the logic of any topos.
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